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Gabriel Marcel and American Philosophy 
David W. Rodick
ABSTRACT: Gabriel Marcel’s thought is deeply informed by the American philosophi-
cal tradition. Marcel’s earliest work focused upon the idealism of Josiah Royce. By the 
time Marcel completed his Royce writings, he had moved beyond idealism and adopted 
a form of metaphysical realism attributed to William Ernest Hocking. Marcel also devel-
oped a longstanding relationship with the American philosopher Henry Bugbee. These 
important philosophical relationships will be examined through the Marcellian themes of 
ontological exigence, intersubjective being, and secondary reflection. Marcel’s relation-
ships with these philosophers are not serendipitous. They are expressions of Marcel’s deep 
Christian faith.
FEW SCHolARS HAVE TAkEN  sufficient note of the fact that Gabriel Marcel’s thought is vitally informed by classical American philosophy. Marcel 
once remarked “a kind of magnetic field stretches around my life, and one of the 
poles of the magnetic field was and remains, in spite of everything, America.”1 
For example, Marcel’s earliest writings consist of incisive commentary concern-
ing the idealism of Josiah Royce. Marcel’s involvement with idealism was short 
lived. He gravitated to a form of metaphysical realism appropriated from William 
Hocking’s The Meaning of God in Human Experience. Marcel also developed a 
longstanding relationship with the American philosopher, Henry Bugbee. Marcel 
believed that he and Bugbee occupied a shared landscape, “illuminated by a light 
of its own.”2 
Each of these relationships will be investigated through a specific lens of Marcel’s 
thought. First, Marcel’s essays on Royce offer a window into the soul of Marcel’s 
philosophical development. The early Marcel was an idealist. His idealism stemmed 
from the omnipresent sense of a “broken world,” an experience of laceration within 
the fabric of existence. The complete ideational fulfillment available through a 
philosophy of idealism offered a salvific repair to this feeling of fracture. The se-
curity derived from idealism soon became too stifling—something akin to a prison 
of immanence closing out the native air of the real. Marcel’s previous involvement 
with idealism provides a unique vantage point from which to engage Royce because 
something remarkably similar to what drove Marcel from idealism is discernable 
in the transition occurring between the middle and late periods of Royce’s thought. 
1Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings [a translation of Marcel’s autobiography En chemin, vers quell éveil], trans. 
Peter Rogers (Milwaukee WI: Marquette Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 211, 213.
2Gabriel Marcel, “Introduction” to The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form 
(State College PA: Bald Eagle Press, 1958), p. 18.
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Hocking was correct when he stated that Marcel’s essays on Royce constitute “the 
first and, still in my judgment the most substantial and prescient, discussion of 
Royce’s entire metaphysical outlook.”3
Second, Marcel’s intuition concerning the primacy of intersubjective experience 
is a pellucid lens through which to examine Hocking’s thought. Within an idealist 
framework, intersubjective contact is never immediate, for it must be mediated 
through a third, a principle of unity. Descartes’s appeal to God as a principle of 
non-deception in Meditation III is a classic example. At critical junctures during 
his career Royce’s appealed to a third, either in the form of an Absolute system of 
ideas or as a series of symbols through which the Absolute is disclosed. Hocking 
had rejected a mediated conception of intersubjective encounter before complet-
ing graduate studies with Royce. His doctoral dissertation argued for “the need to 
restore the stinging reality of contact with the human comrade.”4 Marcel was also 
skeptical of any account of intersubjectivity that did not give credence to the ways in 
which human encounter occurs in experience. Hocking’s stress upon the experiential 
givenness of intersubjective encounter offered Marcel a compelling alternative to 
Royce: “Hocking’s provocative insight on intersubjectivity in the name of experi-
ence challenged Proust’s monadism.”5
Finally, Marcel’s notion of secondary reflection is used to understand his rela-
tionship to Henry Bugbee. According to Bugbee, exigence ontologique constitutes 
a “moving center” of Marcel’s thought, implicating us in a process of “becoming 
beyond ourselves.” We are, to use a term of Marcel’s, disponibilité. Marcel and 
Bugbee explore the contour of experience—the indigenous circuit of associations 
pertaining to the self as coesse. Through a reflexive act Marcel refers to as “ingat-
herdness,” the self undergoes increasing degrees of unification. In order to become 
vested in perpetuity, the self must undergo “an act of faith made explicit only in a 
dialectical act of participation.”6
Marcel’s relationship to these American philosophers is not coincidental. It is 
the philosophical expression of his Christian faith, an attempt to realize a profound 
consistency between philosophy and life. Marcel’s most important legacy is his 
commitment to unity of Christian philosophizing as a unity derived from both reason 
and revelation. Its diversity stems from the objective plurality of what it pursued 
as well as the subjective plurality of those who pursue it. Christian philosophizing 
seeks a truth that every Christian believes can never be untrue to itself.
3William Ernest Hocking, “Preface” to Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics , trans. Virginia and Gordon 
Ringer (Chicago Il: Regnery, 1956), p. vi. See also Quentin lauer, “Royce’s Metaphysics” in Thought 32 
(1957): 450: “[I]t is somewhat paradoxical that Josiah Royce should find his most eloquent interpreter in 
France’s Gabriel Marcel.” Both comments were made before the appearance of the large body of Royce 
scholarship produced by Frank M. oppenheim, S.J.
4W. E. Hocking, “The Elementary Experience of other Conscious Being in Its Relation to the Elementary 
Experience of Physical and Reflexive objects,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 
1904), p. iv.
5 Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings, p. 72.
6“les conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de l’intuition” in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 
20 (1912): 652. I am grateful to Dwayne A. Tunstall for allowing me to consult his unpublished translation. 
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IDEAlISM AS SAlVATIoN: A BRokEN WoRlD
The first philosophical position that Marcel embraced was Idealism. His ideal-
ism resulted from an acute sensitivity to a “broken world.” When Marcel lost his 
mother at a young age his aunts cloistered around him. Even after his father married 
Gabriel’s aunt, a sense of loss remained—a condition that he would later identify 
by the phrase exigence ontologique. Marcel maintained that his involvement with 
idealism was derived from the experiential conditions in which he first found him-
self. Idealism provided a shelter from the “wounding contacts of everyday life.”7 
The young Marcel was destined for idealism.
Marcel’s idealist writings are interesting pieces. His later writings exhibit nu-
merous examples of concrete description while his idealist writings are abstract, 
dialectical treatments of conceptual issues often with uneven clarity. Marcel likened 
his idealistic writings to “a drilling operation performed by unskilled hands.”8 
What can Marcel’s critical examination of the philosophy of Royce’s tell us 
about Marcel? 
Royce’s primary objective in the first volume of The World and the Individual is 
to attack the world knot. The “world knot” is a phrase used to depict the relation-
ship between thought and reality. Royce’s task is to find the key to the world knot. 
The three reigning philosophical conceptions or “ontological predicates”—realism, 
mysticism, and critical rationalism—cannot provide a continuous, comprehensive 
account of the manner in which thought and reality are jointly predicated. An appeal 
to an absolute mind, complete and total, is required in order to provide the systemic 
connection between thought and reality. The key to unlocking the world knot lies 
in the recognition that the truth of philosophical thought can be reached only “[by] 
dealing with the problem of Reality from the side . . . we are supposed to be able 
to attain reality, that is, from the side of ideas.”9 When Royce expresses reverence 
for the relations of life, he is speaking from the context of a world whose unity has 
been abridged by metaphysical conceptions that deny the transparent connection 
between experience and conception. Royce had a penchant for synthesis, believing 
that dualisms are distinctions within continuous structures. Marcel referred to this 
characteristic as the “teleological leitmotiv” of Royce’s metaphysics because “finite 
life is not mere illusion. . . . We are already, even as finite, in touch with Reality.”10 
Royce’s appeal to an absolute system of ideas implied through every finite idea, no 
matter how fragmentary, was his attempt to heal a broken world. 
Royce was convinced that any complete account of the ontological predicate 
must ask “[D]oes our experience, as such, ever compass eternity?”11 We are like 
Browning’s lover:
7Gabriel Marcel, “An Essay in Autobiography” in The Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. Manya Harari 
(New York NY: Citadel Press, 1956), p. 104.
8Gabriel Marcel, The Existential background of Human Dignity (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1963), p. 22. 
9Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, First Series: The Four Historical conceptions of being 
(New York NY: Macmillan Company, 1899), p. 19. 
10Ibid., p. 182.
11Ibid., p. 252. 
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[our] instant is an eternity . . . see[n] in a transient moment. Every one of [our] glimpses 
of fact is like a flash of moonlight on the water. Yet what we see outlasts the ages of ages. 
. . . But [the] form of [our] experience is precisely that of any other human creature of the 
instant’s flight. . . . The valid, then, even the eternally valid, enters our human conscious-
ness through the narrow portals of the instants of experience. . . . Necessity comes home 
to us men through the medium of a given fact.12 
The significance of this passage is not lost upon Marcel. A halo of possibilities 
exists at the fringe of finite knowing—an opening pointing beyond the focus of 
experience hic et nunc: “The pseudo immediate leads us to the mediated.”13 In 
finite consciousness, ideas exhibit a “kind of fulfillment;” not complete or “whole 
fulfillment.” The complete fulfillment of an idea is a fully orchestrated conception: 
“a completely adequate empirical content, for which no other content need to be 
substituted or could be substituted.”14 
Should finite consciousness transcend its functional limitations, an entire expanse 
of existence would “spread before you as a simple and unique life.”15 Within the 
space of totum simul, finite existence exhibits integrity of meaning and purpose: 
That art thou. Each episodic moment is ensconced within a higher unity: 
[W]e see through a glass darkly. It is not yet revealed what we shall be. . . . We wait, 
wonder, pass from fact to fact, from fragment to fragment. What a study of the concept 
of Being reveals to us is precisely that the whole has a meaning and is real only as a 
Meaning Embodied.16
Any given object is more than what can be articulated at any one point in time. 
once each experiential event is mediated within a larger framework, what stands as 
“a totally actualized content . . . ideally conceived”?17 If our focus is shifted to one 
pervasive aspect, this sense of totality is reduced. For Marcel, the vector character 
of experience exhibits an extensive trace of associations whose unifying thread is 
denuded through the excision of abstraction. Adopting the language of the subjec-
tive conditional, what would be the case once an object is considered in terms of the 
infinite extension of its possibilities for conception? For Royce, the question points 
to a lux aeterna. Empiricism, when pursued to its radical limits, leads to idealism: 
“There is no possible resting place on the road to absolute idealism.”18 Royce’s 
synoptic idealism is the result of his devout empiricism.
From a Roycean perspective, experience and conception are correlative terms. 
Royce understood Hegel to hold that if consciousness provides a criterion from 
within itself, any investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself. 
What consciousness affirms from within becomes the standard by which to measure 
12Ibid., pp. 256–57.
13Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 37.
14The World and the Individual (First Series), pp. 336–37.
15Ibid., p. 348.
16Ibid., p. 368.
17Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 29.
18Ibid., p. 14.
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knowledge.19 Experience and conception are like “two faces of the divine life.”20 
Royce’s position is akin to the speculative empiricism of Whitehead, who also ad-
vocated a complete extension of experience in holding that the difference between 
the physical and the psychical are differences “in historic routes of derivation and 
hereditary transmission; they do not present fixed and untraversable gulfs.”21 Reality 
is an open circuit of experience and conception.
Marcel recognized the genius of Royce’s attempt to understand the world knot: 
“[F]or speculative thought this dualism is resolved in unity, and that, in the final 
analysis, all meaning is immanent.”22 Marcel’s concerns, however, are not unlike 
those of William James and others who argued that a complete and total absolute 
results in an identitätsphilosophie of the worst kind—a “block” universe in which 
“the world and the all-thinker thus compenetrate and soak each other up without 
residuum.”23 The question is whether Royce can maintain “the concrete unity of 
freedoms in the midst of absolute freedom.”24 A stock-in-trade inventory of idealist 
principles leads to a “ruinous” dualism or a monism reminiscent of Bradley. Ac-
cording to Marcel, we must “find a fulcrum in the actual [and] start from the real. 
[T]his act partakes more of faith than of abstract thought. The relation . . . between 
God and myself is a relation of individual to individual.”25 
Royce was deeply aware of this problem. At the time he was composing The World 
and the Individual, his response to questions concerning the possibility of freedom 
was similar to that expressed by Meister Eckhart: “Were I not, God himself could not 
be.” The relationship between God and the finite self is one of concordance. on the 
one hand, the finite self is “ferment”—a unique center of activity. Conversely, “[A]
ll finite experience must be regarded as a fragment of the whole, whose content is 
present in the unity of consciousness of one absolute moment.”26 Finite experience 
is uniquely individual and, at the same time, metaphysically integral to the project 
of divine fulfillment.
In The Problem of christianity Royce modified his conception of the absolute, 
using insights derived from Pauline theology and Peircean logic. Royce underwent 
a “Peirceian moment” in 1912.27 Absolute consciousness is conceived semiotically 
within time as opposed to all-at-once—a perfectly ordered system disclosed seriatim 
19See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (New York NY: oxford Univ. Press, 
1977), p. 53. See also p. 10: “[E]verything turns on grasping the True, not only as substance but equally 
as subject.”
20Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 33.
21John Dewey, “Whitehead’s Philosophy” in Problems of Men (New York NY: The Philosophical library, 
1946), p. 413.
22Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 4.
23William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), p. 21.
24Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 49.
25Ibid., p. 73.
26Josiah Royce, The conception of God in critical Responses to Josiah Royce, 1885–1916, Volume 1, 
ed. Randall E. Auxier (Sterling VA: Thommes Press, 2003), p. 204.
27See “Royce’s Acknowledgment of his 1912 ‘Peircean Insight’” in Josiah Royce’s late Writings: A 
collection of Unpublished and scattered Works, ed. Frank M. oppenheim, S.J. (Sterling VA: Thoemmes 
Press, 2001), p. 19. of particular interest is Royce’s acknowledgment of the importance of Peirce in helping 
Royce make his philosophy of loyalty more concrete.
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through a process self-interpretation: “[S]pirit is interpreted, and so interpreted that, 
the whole world is reconciled to its own purpose.”28 The absolute is a function of the 
infinite number and diversity of loyal initiatives, “the infinitely specified whole of 
the modes of manifestation allowed by the spirit of loyalty in the universe.”29 This is 
living reason—a unified and directionally guided activity through which the universe 
evolves in terms of greater degrees of comprehension. The American philosopher 
Robert C. Pollock recognized the implications of Royce’s vision:
But what a drastic alteration in perspective when men can envisage a wide open world 
in which development, spontaneity, and novelty are entirely at home! . . . Given this new 
image of the universe, experimentation and creativity are endowed with a new dignity, 
for they have gained a status within nature itself. Now looked upon as essential aspects 
of a growing world, they speak with an authority to which man gladly responds.30 
Royce’s doctrine of loyalty becomes most crucial at this juncture. Finite selves 
exercise self-determination through acts of loyal service. Such acts are “free” ex-
pressions of personal commitment oriented in perpetuity towards the larger project 
of disclosing the absolute. Acts of loyal participation are ontological defining in 
terms of the finite moment and the eternal life-plan—the act by which I determine 
myself is an act through which God is. living beings are united and understood, but 
not absorbed, by that which transcends them. Through loyal service, “a relation of a 
special kind is established between an individual and the cause . . . which assumes 
both free action and self-subordination.”31 For Marcel, the direction taken by Royce 
reflects the most profound lessons of life:
We see clearly here how loyalty is founded for Royce in the nature of Being. . . . It is 
by no means a group of extrinsic bonds, but real ones, which are established between a 
loyal individual and a distinct community. loyalty is the living participation of the self 
in a concrete order which it undertakes to serve, and which in return confers on the self 
the only reality it can claim. . . . It is an advent.32
It may not be unfair to suggest that Royce’s appeal to loyalty, injecting the pos-
sibility of freedom into a heretofore block universe, offers a voluntaristic release 
akin to James’s “will to believe.” loyalty is a lived act of participation between the 
self and the concrete order. Marcel recognizes the importance of the appeal Royce 
makes to loyalty as “a sort of reflection on his own system . . . , resulting in the 
discovery that there are ideal connections between apparently distinct orders of 
speculation.”33 From Marcel’s perspective, Royce’s effort to leverage the implica-
tions of loyally committed action demonstrates “the preponderant part played by 
28Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 144.
29Ibid., p. 116.
30Robert C. Pollock, “Process and Experience” in John Dewey: His Thought and Influence (Bronx NY: 
Fordham Univ. Press, 1960), p. 165 (emphasis added).
31Gabriel Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. 111.
32Ibid., p. 112.
33Ibid., p. 109.
GAbRIEl MARcEl AnD AMERIcAn PHIlosoPHy 123
the will, by personal activity, in religious certitude, and the role of courage, even 
of risk, in the building of that certitude.”34 Royce’s appeal to loyalty enlivens his 
thought by proving a more concrete, diachronic conception of human understanding 
than the synchronic schema initially offered. As Royce would later proclaim in the 
Philosophy of loyalty, we need “a new heaven and a new earth.”35
By the conclusion of his Royce interpretation, Marcel exhibits an increasing lack 
of patience concerning Royce’s inability to free himself from the architectonic of 
absolute idealism—a failure to “substitut[e] the unpredictable richness of spiritual 
development, for the over-rigid unity of a system.”36 Marcel’s break with idealism 
left an acute sense of skepticism concerning the transparency of the cogito. A 
philosophy that begins with the cogito runs the risk of becoming lost in “a sort of 
dream of itself.”37 Idealism is a philosophy of conception, but reality truly reveals 
itself precisely at that moment it surpasses the forms of representation. Philosophy 
must, Marcel claims, get “a hold on the real at the root of intelligence.”38 We must 
transcend the ubiquity of consciousness in order to inhabit the anterior space Marcel 
refers to as a “zone of adhesion.” Here we take leave of ourselves and move “to a 
center in order to make room for celui qui est—the one who is.”39
REPUDIATING THE GERM oF SolIPSISM: HoCkING AND MARCEl
Marcel considered Hocking a companion of eternity: “a man who, through the vis-
ible world, has never ceased to have a presentiment of what is eternal.”40 It may not 
be an exaggeration to say that Marcel and Hocking came together through Royce. 
Royce maintained that intersubjective relations are confirmed via a third: either 
an absolute mind modeled upon a self-representative system or a self-interpreting 
series of ideas. Hocking understood the primacy of intersubjective experience from 
his mid-western upbringing. We have direct access to others: “our communication 
with our neighbors is as direct and immediate as it needs to be.”41 No appeal to the 
absolute is required to complete the intersubjective circuit. 
Marcel and Hocking are jointly committed to repudiating solipsism. In his 
contribution to the Hocking Festschrift aptly titled overcoming solipsism, Marcel 
recognizes Hocking for having provided the key to unlocking the prison of imma-
nence. A philosophy of immanence reduces reality to the contents of consciousness. 
Sartre provides a powerful account of this conception:
34Ibid., p. 19.
35Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of loyalty (New York NY: Macmillan, 1909), p. 9.
36Ibid., p. 155.
37Gabriel Marcel, being and Having: An Existentialist Diary, trans. k. Farrer (Gloucester MA: Peter 
Smith, 1976), p. 30. 
38Ibid., p. 47. 
39”les conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de l’intuition,” p. 652.
40Existential background of Human Dignity, p. 1.
41leroy S. Rouner, “The Surveyor as Hero: Reflections on Ernest Hockings Philosophy of Nature” in 
contemporary studies in Philosophical Idealism, ed. John Howie and Thomas o. Buford (Cape Cod MA: 
Claude Stark, 1975), p. 54. See Royce’s claim in The World and the Individual, Second Series: nature, 
Man, and the Moral order (New York NY: Macmillan, 1920), p. 89: “Between any two there is a third.”
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[T]he spidery mind trapped things in its web, covered them with a white spit and slowly 
swallowed them, reducing them to its own substance. What is a table, a rock, a house? A 
certain assemblage of “contents of consciousness,” a class of such contents. . . . Is not my 
perception the present state of my consciousness? [An] assimilation of things to ideas, 
of ideas to ideas, of minds by minds. The corpulent structures of the world were picked 
clean by these diligent diastases: assimilation, unification, identification.42
Marcel was a former proponent of immanence and explained the connection between 
ideas and the world epistemically. Experiential relations are ideational constructions, 
the results of cognitive intentions rather than actual modes of intra-relatedness occur-
ring in media res. Intersubjective relations become particularly problematic from the 
perspective of immanence. Royce argued that each self is unique, what he referred 
to as a “complete life plan.” Each self is an expression of its experiential fulfillment, 
a denouement occurring at the altar of the absolute. Royce’s favorite example is 
the conviction that every mother embraces, for Her child is like no other!43 Royce’s 
conception of intersubjectivity led one commentator to suggest that Roycean selves 
are like windowless monads with “skylights” to the absolute. After reading The 
Meaning of God in Human Experience, Marcel was convinced that intersubjective 
relations “are actually in experience [which, when] grasped at its center, we find the 
means of transcending that experience, and not at all, as I had believed for so long, 
in going outside of it and appealing to a set of a priori principles.”44
Intersubjective experience reflects an embryonic bond; the “other” is present ab 
initio—in “a vein of non-solitude [buried] in the depths of the solitary ego.”45 When 
I experience the other, we meet without barrier. Evidence of this connection can be 
seen in Descartes’s proclamation concerning the universality of the cogito; does not 
leibniz’s conception of “windowless monads” presuppose a dimension in and from 
which all monads are windowless? Categorical affirmations of privacy indicate a 
dimension of shared universality. The orientation of intersubjective experience is 
primarily dative; only in its derivative mode does intersubjective encounter assume 
an accusative form. Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that phenomenology was a 
movement long before becoming a doctrine, intersubjective experience, begebensein, 
is primordial. The self is sensitive and permeable; capable of extending its presence 
in a wider radius. For Marcel, “This irrepressible universality joins itself . . . to the 
inwardness of the cogito.”46
The primary datum of human experience is a felt relation between self and other. 
Feeling is a movement towards an objective terminus, providing the tour de force 
of objectivity, a process that Hocking likens to osmosis. Feeling is also cognitively 
intentional; the self possesses the ability to become ideationally transcendent 
42Jean-Paul Sartre, “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology,” trans. Joseph P. 
Fell in Journal of the british society for Phenomenology I (1970): 4.
43See Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (First Series), pp. 458–60.
44Gabriel Marcel, “Solipsism Surmounted” in Philosophy, Religion, and the coming World civilization: 
Essays in Honor of William Ernest Hocking, ed. leroy S. Rouner (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 23.
45Ibid., p. 24.
46Gabriel Marcel, “I and Thou,” trans. Forrest Williams in The Philosophy of Martin buber, ed. P. A. 
Schillp and M. Friedman (Chicago Il: open Court, 1967), p. 25.
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while remaining immanent, “allowing for a perfect continuity between prophecy 
and fulfillment.”47 Ideas possess an “uncounted infinity”—an unlimited range of 
application. The apperceptive potential of the self is a function of its ideational 
capacity—providing the self with the capability of traversing the experiential field. 
Combining reach of thought with depth of feeling, we find ourselves anchored in 
a world with others while harboring a sense of something more. Hocking empha-
sizes the “metaphysical density” of experience. The whole is given all-at-once: 
“We do not learn to see space little by little. The child’s space is as great as the 
man’s, namely, whole space.”48 The whole exists both perennially and cumula-
tively as a “non-impulsive background,” thereby causing Hocking to once remark 
with humor that even the infant is a metaphysician, though, quite happily, not by 
name or title. 
one of Hocking’s favorite examples is the phrase “Here we are.” The phrase 
bespeaks a relational expanse in which I exist, we exist, as well as a third, for the 
field in which the here lies and that binds us into a we. Within this “meeting ground” 
or “zone of adhesion,” we breathe intersubjective, native air: “In all of these situ-
ations the encounter does not take place in each of the participants, or in a neutral 
unity encompassing them, but between them in a most exact sense, in a dimension 
accessible to them alone.”49 This dimension must be approached dynamically in 
order to prevent mésalliance into an objective category; an opening is required 
if adhesion is to be experienced. This process consists of a gradual unfolding of 
prior unity. Marcel is famous for his examples of person-to-person encounter that 
demonstrate how concrete acts of experiential intercourse occur de profundis: “We 
become simply us.”50 As Hocking was fond of saying, “I can imagine no contact 
more real and more thrilling than this.”51
Intersubjective experience is felt through the body. The body acts as an intra-
mundane medium—a “grip” predicating self and world. The body is subject to 
space, time, and causality; but the self’s apperceptive potential gives it the ability 
to be “space-free [and] time free, as the body is not.”52 The body acts as a conduit, 
or sluice, through which experience is transmuted into thought. The self is not a 
completely autonomous being closed in upon itself. We are beings open to being. 
The reflective self exhibits the potential to achieve divine-like (theómorphos) status 
while traversing the far reaches of the experiential continuum. As the self becomes 
increasingly open to the universe, it approaches the realization of personhood. 
Self-realization and intersubjectivity are co-dimensions of human being. Hocking’s 
emphasis upon the experiential givenness of intersubjective encounter served as 
47William E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (New Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press, 
1912), p. 95.
48Ibid., p. 95.
49Gabriel Marcel, “I and Thou,” p. 43.
50Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, trans. B. Wahl (Chicago Il: Regnery, 1952), p. 146.
51Hocking, Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 266. See also William E. Hocking, “Marcel 
and the Ground Issue of Metaphysics” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (1954): 458. 
“Intersubjectivity is either everywhere or nowhere.”
52William E. Hocking, The self, Its body and Freedom (New Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1928), pp. 31, 35. 
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“an advance in the direction of that metaphysical realism toward which [Marcel] 
resolutely tended.”53
SECoNDARY REFlECTIoN AS REFlEXIVE:  
GABRIEl MARCEl AND HENRY BUGBEE
The unity of Henry Bugbee’s life and thought appears strange when judged by 
contemporary standards. Calvin o. Schrag regrettably characterized Bugbee as one 
of the more marginalized philosophers of the twentieth century. Willard van orman 
Quine described him as the ultimate exemplar of the examined life. Bugbee’s major 
work, The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form, is a 
series of journal entries. Already aware of the limitations of formal philosophical 
writing as an undergraduate, he acknowledges: “Certainly anyone who throws his 
entire personality into his work must to some extent adopt an aesthetic attitude 
and medium.”54
Bugbee began reading Marcel’s The Mystery of being while teaching at Harvard. 
Bugbee and Marcel became kindred spirits. In 1955 they attended Heidegger’s 
lectures in France. Their emphasis upon concreteness and place, the peripatetic 
nature of reflection, and their testimony given to the ethical, aesthetic, and religious 
dimensions of experience caused Bugbee to remark: “Marcel’s writings spoke to 
my condition. Marcel helped me to find my own voice.”55
Bugbee believed that the empirical self is spiritual—a unity of multiplicity writ 
small:
This, then, is the unique character of consciousness, whereby many elements are combined 
within a unified personality, and thus the Spirit represents the supreme embodiment of 
both the one and the many, an integrally logical manifold of infinitely diverse particulars. 
Such is the logic of personality, and it must furnish the basis of any living philosophy.56
When a self is experientially impacted, a mental response occurs in the form of an 
image, sensation, idea, or thought. Qua mental (Geistigheit), these affective responses 
potentially elevate the subject into the realm of spirit (Geist), thereby revealing an 
ontological perspective that exceeds the material. Similar to what Hocking referred 
to as our “apperceptive mass,” the human capacity for increasing the scope of 
reflection constitutes the cognitive side of mystical experience—a grafting of the 
flesh onto spirit. As Emerson said, “let a man fall into his divine circuits, and he is 
enlarged. obedience to his genius is the only liberating influence.”57 For Bugbee, 
53Gabriel Marcel, “Author’s Forward to the English Edition” in Royce’s Metaphysics, p. x.
54Henry G. Bugbee Jr., In Demonstration of the spirit (Princeton University Undergraduate Thesis, 1936), 
p. 83. For a detailed discussion of Bugbee’s life and thought see David W. Rodick, “Finding one’s own 
Voice: The Philosophical Development of Henry G. Bugbee Jr.” in The Pluralist 6 (2011): 18–34.
55Henry G. Bugbee Jr., The Inward Moring: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form (State College 
PA: Bald Eagle Press, 1958), p. 13.
56Henry G. Bugbee Jr., In Demonstration of the spirit, p. 14.
57Ralph Waldo Emerson, “New England Reformers” in Essays, Second Series (Boston MA: Houghton, 
1876), p. 284.
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the reflexive realization of Spirit constitutes an “inward morning”—an awakening 
through personal illumination.
Marcel referred to the recuperative process of seeking greater comprehensive 
unity as secondary reflection. Secondary reflection is a process of inward reflex-
ion.58 Much like the subject of a reflexive verb, the self is implicated in its mental 
activity, aware of its role in a recursive process of shaping and being-shaped. At 
the reflexive level, thinking is capable of giving birth to something more than 
itself. Reflexion explores the ontological circuitry in which beings are implicated. 
The disclosure of more comprehensive unities reveals a dimension of experi-
ence that is not explainable in strictly material terms. knowledge exhibits a vast 
mnemonic dimension.
To exist, for Marcel, is to become actualized in perpetuity by re-inscribing oneself 
in the eternal. The self has access to a sempiternal dimension, thereby indicating “evi-
dence of fixed stars in the heaven of the soul.”59 This dimension is not given a priori 
according to some kind of pre-existing structure, for it is creatively achieved. The 
provisional, transitory aspects of human being seek something more permanent—a 
condition not reducible to the transitory nature of becoming. My being is reached 
or “there” only as I achieve it: “Everything seems to go on as if I found myself 
acting on an intuition which I possess already without knowing myself to possess 
it—an intuition which cannot be, strictly speaking, self-conscious and which can 
grasp itself only through the modes of experience in which its image is reflected, 
and which it lights up by being thus reflected in them.”60 The self that is creatively 
achieved is spiritual, a self that cannot be objectified.
The transformative dimension of reflexion must be recovered lest it become 
lost through a myopic concern with the self as an epistemologically defined 
center of activity. The ontological index of Marcel’s thought is exigence on-
tologique. The phrase “exigence of being” is not offered in the strictly negative 
sense of need or lack. Modern experience, dominated by materialistic concep-
tions, appears to be bereft of any experience of being. At the same time, this 
vague sense of being bereft is tied to an awareness of something present, a case 
of metaphysical disquiet. As Heidegger has pointed out, one is able to speak 
of a condition of seinsvergessenheit only by virtue of not having completely 
forgotten one’s forgottenness. For Bugbee, exigence ontologique constitutes the 
“moving center” of Marcel’s thought, thus implicating us in “a kind of becoming 
beyond ourselves.”61
Being makes a claim upon us: “The being of beings in time is somehow bestowed 
upon them.”62 We are disponibilité. According to Bugbee, our ability “to be radically 
58For the transformative potential of reflexion, see Romans 12:2, “Do not be confirmed to this world but 
be transformed by the renewal of your mind.”
59Gabriel Marcel, Homo viator: An Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, trans. E. Craufurd (New York 
NY: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 9.
60Gabriel Marcel, being and Having, p. 118.
61Henry G. Bugbee Jr., “l’Exigence ontologique” in The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, ed. Paul E. 
Schillp and l. E. Hahn (laSalle Il: open Court, 1984), p. 81.
62Henry G. Bugbee Jr., “Thoughts on Creation” in Essays in Philosophy (State College PA: The Penn-
sylvania State Univ. Press, 1962), p. 134.
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claimed and sustained in being with beings . .  . [comes] from a grounding most 
intimately inward yet infinitely distant from us.”63 like Bugbee, Marcel explores 
the contour of experience in order to illuminate the experiential trajectory occur-
ring as the self recollects its extant comprehensiveness at the same time that the 
self abandons itself to a sense of mystery exceeding its grasp. An experience of this 
kind is an act of “reciprocal implication”—a bi-directional, interactive unity. Failure 
to recognize the reflexivity of the experience results in a limited understanding of 
self and world.
Bugbee emphasizes the role that each of us plays in the realization of being. In 
order “to be as the creatures we really are . . . means that we are able to be in the 
image of being, which is no thing at all.”64 Human being exists only in so far as 
it is reflexively animated through the disclosure of beings: Being “appears as that 
which dawns and is in the dawning.”65 Things now resonate with a trace of origina-
tion that exceeds the space of their immediate disclosure. Marcel put it this way: 
“[T]his region where the now and then tend to merge . . . could be nothing other 
than Eternity.”66
Bugbee offers the story of Job as testimonial to the “absolute” in experience. 
Job’s situation discloses the most urgent ethical question: Where is God? The turn-
ing point in Job’s life occurs at the moment of his encounter with the presence of 
God as reflected through the whirling tempest. Job’s revelation assumes the shape 
of a vision. The space of revelation has been prepared; but not through any sense 
of downtroddenness, resentment, or lack of faith. Job is open to revelation through 
his capacity to engage in a form of mutual address:
Simply it is the vision of things: the things of heaven-and-earth, dramatized in their emer-
gent majesty, wonder, and inviolable reserve. But seen in the mode of this, their being. 
And seen as if, for the first time, yet as belonging to a domain, in which dominion (not 
domination) reigns, forever and ever; the dominion of being itself.67
The story of Job is demonstrates the need to step outside quotidian understand-
ing and remain open to what Bugbee refers to as “unconditional affirmation.” The 
openness exhibited by Job—a comportment that we too may embrace—leads to a 
sense of grace, recalling us to our senses! By re-inscribing the immediacy of the 
present, which was there all along within the higher unity of “secondary reflec-
tion,” a condition of sempiternal realization is made possible. As Job realized at 
the end of his ordeal (42:3–6): “I have spoken about great things which I have not 
understood but now I see with my own eyes. Therefore I melt away.” Ratiocination 
is a foreign medium here. What was perceived per speculum et in aenigmate is now 
seen “face to face.”
63Henry G. Bugbee Jr., “l’Exigence ontologique,” p. 83. 
64Henry G. Bugbee Jr., “Thoughts on Creation,” pp. 138–39.
65Ibid., p. 134.
66Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of being: Reflection and Mystery, Volume I, trans. G. S. Fraser (New York 
NY: Gateway Editions, 1950), p. 194.
67Henry G. Bugbee Jr. A Way of Reading the book of Job (unpublished).
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CHRISTIAN IMPlICATIoNS
Is Marcel’s relationship to American Philosophy simply contingent and gratu-
itous, or an indication of something more important? While preparing to formally 
embrace the Christian faith at age 41, the question as to which denomination he 
would adhere had yet to be decided. His religious upbringing was agnostic. Marcel 
chose the Catholic Church for Marcellian reasons. Catholicism was synonymous 
with the universal, whereas the multiple sects within Protestantism undermined 
the deep sense of unity Marcel sought: “It then seemed to me that I could not give 
my adherence save to the Church that presented itself as corresponding to the 
richest and most global vision.”68 In a journal entry dated 23 March 1929, Marcel 
disclosed the following: “I was baptized this morning. My inward state was more 
than I had dared to hope for: no transports, but peaceful, balanced, and full of hope 
and faith.”69 Marcel’s reference to “no transports,” suggests the experiential impact 
of conversion is not to be characterized as some spectacular event such as a bolt of 
lightning. Nonetheless, the ontological impact of conversion was deeply felt. Mar-
cel’s conversion was a: “Return to the here and now, which recover an unparalleled 
dignity and worth.”70 
Marcel recognized aspects of Catholicism contrary to his sensibility. When asked 
about these matters Marcel responded: “When we say: we other Catholics, we are 
outside Catholicism. catholicity, in my view, that is what matters.”71 The fundamental 
truths of Christianity are coeval with the integral structure of the human being: “the 
more one penetrates into human nature, the more one finds oneself situated on the 
axes of the great truths of Christianity.”72 While irresistibly drawn into the domain 
of Christian beliefs, Marcel never abandoned his commitment to reaching a level of 
understanding sufficiently universal to be appreciated by non-Catholics and even by 
non-Christians, so long as there is a commitment to what is essential. Marcel referred 
to this universal dimension as “peri-Christian.” Marcel’s most important legacy is his 
sustained commitment to unity of Christian philosophizing. Christian philosophizing 
requires an appeal to a multitude of sources, but an authentic expression of Christian 
faith requires the transcendence of limited meaning spheres. No single philosophical 
system exhibits the deposit of faith. A priori dictates concerning methodological 
orientation risk “set[ting] oneself outside of the very conditions of philosophical 
activity.”73 limiting conceptions leave an experiential residue, something like “a 
still small voice [that] is not heard in them.”74 Instead of a Christian philosophy, it 
68Gabriel Marcel, “An Essay in Autobiography,” p. 29.
69Gabriel Marcel, being and Having, p. 24.
70Ibid., p. 24.
71Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings, p. 181.
72Gabriel Marcel, creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rostal (New York NY: Farrar, Straus and Company, 
1964), p. 79.
73Gabriel Marcel, “Regarding The spirit of Medieval Philosophy by Mr. Etienne Gilson” in Reason 
Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930 christian Philosophy Debates in France, ed. and trans. Gregory B. Sadler 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2011), p. 174.
74Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York NY: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 237. 
Royce believed that limiting conceptions are unable to satisfy the demands of spiritual life. Marcel’s clearly 
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may be more appropriate to speak of the unity of Christian philosophizing. Marcel 
would often speak of a “spiritual convergence” or a sense of co-belonging (co-
appartenance à) between himself and his interlocutors—a condition traditional 
philosophy is not willing to recognize. The task of Christian philosophizing must 
be to seek truth wherever it may lie—searching for insights wherever authentic in-
tellectual experience can be found. Marcel, Royce, Hocking, and Bugbee serve as 
profound examples of Christian philosophizing. Their thinking bespeaks a reflexive 
unity stemming from the truth sought as well as the kaleidoscopic, kergymatic, and 
kairotic gifts exhibited during the seeking. As in the case with all committed truth 
seekers, Christian philosophers “will that which grows out of [them]; and in that to 
which the sequent thinking arrives, [they] remain companion, helper, and friend.”75 
Christian philosophizing seeks a truth that every Christian believes can never be 
untrue to itself. The aim of Christian philosophizing is to be that of which it speaks.
recognized the Catholic character of Royce’s philosophy: “The truth is that Royce, with an eclecticism which 
by no means implies feebleness of thought, searched for his solutions wheresoever he found authentic and 
profound intellectual experience, wheresoever he felt a direct contact with that reality in which we bathe 
and outside of which we are nothing (Royce’s Metaphysics, xvi).”
75William E. Hocking, “Preface” to Marcel, Royce’s Metaphysics, p. viii. 
